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The subject of this symposium issue is the status of the unitary ex-
ecutive under the American Constitution.  For the purposes of this 
Article, the term “unitary executive” receives a narrow definition that 
tracks Steven Calabresi and Christopher Yoo’s careful and exacting 
historical account of the topic.1  The only question at stake is wheth-
er, and to what extent, the President has the power to fire—delicately 
referred to as the “power to remove”—officials within the executive 
branch.  Is that power one that can be exercised unilaterally and at 
will, or is it one that can only be exercised for cause or with the con-
currence of the legislative branch, or some portion thereof?  Article 
II does not address the endless permutations of removal, which are 
difficult enough in connection with ordinary employment contracts 
that are negotiated without any constitutional overlay.2  Instead, it on-
ly offers a skeletal account of the executive branch.  The Vesting 
Clause reads:  “The executive Power shall be vested in a President of 
the United States of America.  He shall hold his Office during the 
Term of four Years . . . .”3  The Take Care Clause provides that “he 
shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”4  In addition, Ar-
ticle II contains a provision detailing the process of appointment for 
various public officials.5  As is typical, the Constitution contains no 
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 1 For this historical account, see STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE 
UNITARY EXECUTIVE:  PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH (2008). 
 2 For my views on this question, see Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 
U. CHI. L. REV. 947 (1984) (examining the arguments for and against the contract at will 
and defending it as intrinsically fair and mutually beneficial to employers and employ-
ees). 
 3 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1. 
 4 Id. § 3. 
 5 See id. § 2, cl. 2 (“He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, 
to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall nomi-
nate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, 
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definitions section that might shed light on these sparse provisions.  
Their explication is left to judicial interpretation based, at least in  
part, on common usage at the time.  As is always the case in novel 
ventures, the text is not sufficiently developed to resolve future legal 
disputes. 
More specifically, Article II contains one void that cannot be easily 
filled.  For all its attention to appointments, it does not contain a sin-
gle word directed to the back end of the process:  what powers does 
the President have to remove various executive officials when they 
clash with the President?  A single sentence that provided that “the 
President shall (not) be able to remove all superior and inferior of-
fices in the executive branch at will” could have resolved this question 
neatly, without appealing to the lofty reaches of political theory.  Fu-
ture generations could then decide whether the clear constitutional 
design had withstood the test of time. 
The absence of clear guidance thus transforms the rules govern-
ing removal of executive branch officials into a hotly contested mat-
ter of constitutional interpretation.  That interpretive quest takes 
place against the backdrop of textual provisions for a rigid separation 
of powers that speaks in categorical terms about the legislative, ex-
ecutive, and judicial branches.  These separate branches are not au-
tarkic because the Constitution also imposes a rich set of checks and 
balances that leave each branch autonomous in only some, but not 
all, of their activities.  The extensive application of these two con-
straints reflects a clear preference for limited government, which is 
echoed in two other major constitutional themes:  a federal system 
with limited and enumerated powers, and a Bill of Rights that en-
trenches substantial constitutional protection for individual rights, 
consistent with the theme of limited government, dealing with such 
topics as property, contract, speech, and religion.6 
 
other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers 
of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and 
which shall be established by Law:  but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of 
such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, 
or in the Heads of Departments.”). 
 6 For a discussion of a different constitutional structure, see Mark A. Graber, Enumeration 
and Other Constitutional Strategies for Protecting Rights:  The View from 1787/1791, 9 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 357 (2007) (distinguishing between a formulation of well-designed governing 
institutions and an affirmative enumeration of rights as methods of protecting against 
government infringement upon fundamental liberties). 
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Regrettably, that original Lockean preference has not survived the 
constitutional transformations of the Progressive era.7  From the late-
nineteenth century through the advent of the New Deal, the Su-
preme Court was busily knocking down the barriers that stood in the 
path of large government.  On federalism, the key development was 
the enormous expansion of congressional power under the Com-
merce Clause.  The early cases tended to exclude manufacture from 
the scope of the Commerce Clause.8  During the New Deal era, the 
clause was reinterpreted to allow extensive regulation of manufacture 
and agriculture.9  By dint of hard labor, it has expanded to the point 
where it now covers even solitary flies in isolated locales.10  One major 
theme has been the rise of the rational basis test in economic affairs, 
which renders off limits virtually any challenge to any general tax or 
regulation that Congress or the states could devise,11 even as more 
powerful protections remain in place against most, but by no means 
all, government regulation of speech and religion.12  Big government 
may not have been an original constitutional imperative, but it has 
become a permanent feature of our political landscape.  Today, there 
is more business, for more permissible ends, at both the federal and 
state levels. 
These huge demands have taken their toll on the original consti-
tutional understanding of the executive power which, in turn, has 
placed real pressure on the President’s power to remove members of 
the much-enlarged executive branch.  This matter itself may look 
small compared to the weighty issues of the distribution of powers be-
 
 7 For the transformation in connection with the nondelegation doctrine, see Douglas 
Ginsburg & Steven Menashi, Nondelegation and the Unitary Executive, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 
251 (2009). 
 8 See, e.g., United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 12 (1895) (reasoning that Congress 
lacks the power to regulate wholly intrastate manufacture of sugar under the Sherman 
Antitrust Act since control of the manufacture of a good affects its disposition only inci-
dentally and indirectly). 
 9 The key mileposts on that journey are Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 133 (1942), which 
upheld provisions of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, and NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel 
Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 49 (1937), which upheld the National Labor Relations Act. 
 10 See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041, 1057 (D.C. Cir. 1997) 
(upholding federal regulation of the Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly in the San Bernar-
dino, California area under a very narrow reading of United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 
(1995)). 
 11 See, e.g., Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 227–28 (1986) (uphold-
ing a statute that retroactively removed exit rights to plan participants). 
 12 For one decision that reveals the tendency to allow progressive notions to justify the regu-
lation of speech, see McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003) (upholding Title I and II of the 
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002). 
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tween the Congress and the President over issues of war and peace,13 
yet the removal rules, although rarely dramatic, work in tandem with 
other parts of the Constitution.  There is little doubt that the resolu-
tion of this issue is both intertwined with other questions—for exam-
ple, the scope of the delegation doctrine—and critical in its own right 
of the day-to-day business of running a government.  Let the ability of 
the President to fire his officials be subject to senatorial (or even 
congressional) approval, or otherwise limited in ways Congress speci-
fies, and the balance of power shifts in favor of the legislature.  Give 
the President the power to fire at will, and the distribution of power is 
more evenly balanced, because the Senate still has the power to deny 
its approval to the new nominee, who may be needed to execute key 
functions of government. 
In order to get some handle on this complex set of issues, the re-
mainder of this Article addresses two interrelated topics.  In Part I, I 
ask why the system of separation of powers needs to place some 
strong limits on the presidential power to control operations within 
the executive branch.  In order to do this, I compare the presidential 
system with two other organizations, one political and one not:  the 
former is the English parliamentary system, and the latter is the mod-
ern corporation.  After this exposition, the second portion of the Ar-
ticle examines how this basic arrangement tends to fall apart as the 
scale of government operations increases, leading to the rise of the 
inelegant compromises of the administrative state.  In order to make 
good on this inquiry, it is necessary to move somewhat further afield, 
for the operation of the removal power is dependent on a large range 
of other topics, including the creation of the Article I courts, the es-
tablishment of independent administration agencies, and the opera-
tion of the nondelegation doctrine.  In the end, I think that it is not 
possible to attack the use of administrative agencies to the extent that 
they engage in some cross between legislative and executive func-
tions, but it is also unwise to allow independent administrative agen-
cies to take on traditional judicial functions.  Even at this late date, a 
reversal of that portion of the New Deal constitutional order seems 
appropriate. 
 
 13 For the textual tension, compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15–18 (setting out the Con-
gressional power with respect to war and peace), with id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (setting forth the 
President’s power as “Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States”).  
For my views, see Richard A. Epstein, Executive Power, the Commander in Chief, and the Militia 
Clause, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 317 (2005) (arguing that inflated claims for broad executive 
power over issues of national security have no textual or historical justification). 
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I.  PRESIDENTIAL VERSUS PARLIAMENTARY AND CORPORATE SYSTEMS 
It is a commonplace observation that there is much overlap be-
tween public and private systems of governance.  In both settings, the 
law of contract, insofar as it deals with simple bilateral transactions 
like contracts of sale and hire, does not address the relevant issues:  
simple exchanges of labor or property, without more, do not give rise 
to government structures.  But once parties to a voluntary agreement 
seek to create long-term arrangements, they find that complete con-
tingent state contracts cannot begin to do the job.  In their place, go-
vernance mechanisms must be created to allocate power to make fu-
ture decisions when a unanimity of opinion on key issues is known to 
be unattainable.  In this connection, the voluntary organizations in 
corporate or charitable institutions offer a useful point of departure 
for getting at the appropriate division of power in public organiza-
tions.  Thus, the simple conveyance of a private home gradually gives 
way to the complex governance structure of the subdivision, coopera-
tive, or condominium.14 
To be sure, there are systematic differences between these differ-
ent types of organizations.  All charitable and for-profit institutions 
have the luxury of selecting their members by voluntary means.  
Their greater internal coherence makes it possible for them to define 
a mission on which members agree, both as to means and to ends.  
While these organizations can develop deep fissures over their life-
times, especially in the face of unforeseen circumstances that inevita-
bly crop up in complex organizations, political organizations have 
these tensions built in on the ground floor, because they must neces-
sarily deal with the insistent claims of divergent groups that surely will 
not see eye-to-eye on some questions.  The need to include diverse 
territories and groups leads, on average, to higher levels of heteroge-
neity in preferences, which can take ominous turns when the key divi-
sions follow racial or ethnic lines.  Both voluntary and political struc-
tures should rely on exit rights as a way to ease tension.  Yet these are 
generally more costly to exercise in a political setting, for individuals 
cannot just resign their positions or sell shares to someone else; in-
stead they must emigrate from the country, forced to leave their 
homes and communities and to abandon lifelong associations, often 
with no prospect of return.15  The combination of greater heteroge-
 
 14 I trace this notion out in Richard A. Epstein, Covenants and Constitutions, 73 CORNELL L. 
REV. 906 (1988). 
 15 For a discussion of these issues, see Vicki Been, “Exit” as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions:  
Rethinking the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 539–40 (1991) 
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neity and less effective exit rights often leads to greater factional ten-
sion and dissension, which in turn requires that well-designed gov-
ernments put into place more extensive and better articulated consti-
tutional safeguards to combat the ever-present risks of faction and 
intrigue.  The private arrangements, therefore, do not offer a perfect 
precedent to the nettlesome riddles of political organization, but they 
still offer instructive analogies that it would be unwise to ignore. 
It is therefore no surprise that in private associations and organi-
zations, we see some elements that resonate in constitutional terms.  
The most common features of these organizations is that they have a 
board of directors that is responsible for setting policy and a chief ex-
ecutive officer (CEO) who is responsible for carrying out the direc-
tives of that board.  That distinction is familiar to anyone who has 
read the justification for this institutional arrangement in the Federal-
ist Papers.16  The board of directors, like the Congress, need not be in 
constant session to do its work.  It can meet and recess on a regular 
basis, so that only a serious emergency requires it to be called back 
into session—which is one of the powers afforded to the President by 
the United States Constitution.17  That body, however, cannot handle 
the day-to-day execution of the laws and cannot take direct responsi-
bility for the persons who administer it.  Those jobs are left to the 
President. 
But what governmental structures mediate the arrangement be-
tween these two branches?  In most corporations, the salient feature 
is that the CEO serves at the will of the board of directors, which can 
remove him from office at any time and for any reason.  That result 
holds even in those cases where the nominal appointment is for a 
term of years.  That structural design matters, for unjust dismissal can 
 
(describing limits on businesses’ and residents’ abilities to “exit” communities and insuf-
ficient constraints on municipal governments’ rent-seeking behavior).  Note that exit 
rights themselves are not guaranteed constitutionally, which limits the extent to which 
they can function as a protector of other kinds of rights.  See Richard A. Epstein, Exit 
Rights and Insurance Regulation:  From Federalism to Takings, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 293, 308–
11 (1999) (arguing that exit rights are necessary to constrain government action but have 
no clear authority in the Federal Constitution). 
 16 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 23 (Alexander Hamilton) (justifying proposals to strengthen the 
powers of the federal government under the Federal Constitution). 
 17 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (“[H]e may, on extraordinary Occasions, convene both Hous-
es, or either of them . . . .”).  It is also worth noting that the structure of the “Republican 
Form of Government” clause alludes to this distinction at the state level.  See id. art. IV, § 4 
(“The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of 
Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on Application of the 
Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened), against do-
mestic Violence.”). 
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lead to an obligation to pay the CEO and other high corporate offi-
cials compensation, perhaps in the form of a golden-parachute ar-
rangement, to ensure that they step down from their positions with-
out a fight.18  But those compensation arrangements are details; what 
really matters in this context are the structural issues.  One well-
established principle in American contract law is that employees do 
not get the remedy of specific performance when dismissed from 
their jobs.19  Courts uniformly and emphatically take the position that 
they will not try to supervise the discretionary decisions that are al-
ways involved in employment contracts.  Courts also bridle at the 
thought that forced association on matters of fiduciary duties is an ef-
fective way to run a business.  Indeed the only cases in which specific 
performance—or, more accurately, reinstatement—is allowed are 
under labor statutes where it is required precisely because the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act imposes duties to bargain in good faith, 
which themselves strip an employer of the ability to walk away from 
the collective bargaining agreement without showing cause.20 
The decision to allow the board of directors to fire the CEO of any 
voluntary organization shapes the operation of the organization from 
top to bottom.  Thus it is common in universities, for example, for 
the president to have an absolute say on the selection of a provost 
and of the deans of the key units.  Similarly, in businesses, the CEO 
can usually appoint or fire at will all members of the executive suite.  
On these matters there may be some loose requirement for reporting 
major changes that the CEO has made inside the organization to the 
board, and it is often prudent for the president of the corporation or 
charitable institution to consult with key board members before mak-
ing that decision.  But the decisions to appoint and fire are absolute 
and are not subject to any formal kind of board control. 
 
 18 See, e.g., Eric Dash, Has the Exit Sign Ever Looked So Good?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2007, at C6 
(describing high executive compensation awarded to CEOs who have resigned or been 
fired); Gretchen Morgenson, The C.E.O.’s Parachute Cost What?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2007, 
at C1 (discussing pressures to end shareholder reimbursements for CEO excise taxes paid 
on executive compensation). 
 19 See, e.g., Lumley v. Wagner, (1852) 42 Eng. Rep. 687, 693 (Ch.) (denying specific per-
formance of a labor contract but allowing an injunction against third party hiring).  See 
also N. Del. Indus. Dev. Corp. v. E.W. Bliss Co., 245 A.2d 431, 432 (Del. Ch. 1968) (deny-
ing specific performance of a complex building contract, by which it would “become 
committed to supervising the carrying out of a massive, complex, and unfinished con-
struction contract, a result which would necessarily follow as a consequence of ordering 
defendant to requisition laborers as prayed for”). 
 20 See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (2006) (stating that an employer 
is prohibited from “refus[ing] to bargain collectively with the representatives of his em-
ployees”). 
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The reason for this distribution of power is clear.  The ability of 
the board to fire the CEO at will supplies sufficient control of all the 
executive activities inside the corporation.  Once the board fires one 
CEO, it is in a position to appoint another on an interim or perma-
nent basis, who has the exact same powers to hire and fire as the out-
going CEO.  There is, therefore, no way that the outgoing CEO can 
bind successors.  Indeed, there is no way in which successful CEOs 
can transfer their karma to their successors upon their retirement.  
Hence, with a change in the guard, the only open question is whether 
second-tier officials who are caught in the undertow are entitled to 
some compensation by way of severance pay, which can be decided in 
advance. 
There are, of course, some instructive ambiguities in the role of 
the corporate president.  One major structural question is whether 
the corporate president is also the chairman of the board, which 
leads to greater integration between policy and execution but could 
easily stifle the independence of the board precisely when it is 
needed most.21  On this score, the general British preference—which 
reflects the structure of their parliamentary institutions—is to have a 
separate chairman of the board.  The decided preference on the 
American side, at least until recently, has been to make the CEO the 
chairman of the board as well.  So when ticklish issues of executive 
performance arise, the remainder of the board has to meet by itself, 
as it can do, to decide whether, how, and when to remove the CEO.  
But for all these variations, the key design feature of this system is 
that the CEO is given near-absolute power in the running of the 
business precisely because he is subject to removal from office at the 
pleasure of the board. 
This system of private control is reflected in the British parliamen-
tary system, where the Prime Minister has absolute control over the 
members of his cabinet, subject, of course, to his own removal if he 
loses a vote of confidence in Parliament or if he is voted out of office 
in a public election.  The close connection between the cabinet and 
the Parliament creates an immediate need for a strong civil service to 
provide continuity that is lacking with political change—a feature 
that is also necessary in the American system due to its current mas-
sive proportions.  But given the power of removing the Prime Minis-
ter, there is no elaborate system for the confirmation of new govern-
 
 21 See, e.g., Joel Seligman, A Modest Revolution in Corporate Governance, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1159, 1175–79 (2005) (explaining reasons for SEC requirements to separate the role of 
the CEO from the role of the Chairman of the Board). 
Feb. 2010] EXECUTIVE POWER IN POLITICAL AND CORPORATE CONTEXTS 285 
 
ment officials by the Parliament (or even one House), nor any say in 
their removal.  The entire process follows well-established and con-
venient corporate principles.  Whatever differences emerge between 
public and private institutions are taken into account elsewhere in 
the parliamentary system. 
On this account, enormous structural consequences attach to the 
Founders’ decision to maintain a strict system of separation of pow-
ers, subject to appropriate checks and balances, as an indispensable 
safeguard against tyranny.22  To make good on that agenda, it was 
strictly necessary to build into the constitutional structure an inde-
pendent executive branch headed by a President with a definite term 
who is not answerable to Congress, except through impeachment, the 
ultimate “for cause” dismissal that requires proof of the commission 
of a high crime or misdemeanor before a Senate trial upon prosecu-
tion by the House of Representatives.  As grounds for impeachment 
are only rarely available, the necessity arises to develop some more 
modest mechanisms to keep the President in line during his term of 
office.  Quite simply, absolute power does not mesh well with a pro-
tected four-year term.  One possible approach, not taken by the fed-
eral Constitution, is to develop an unbundled executive, so that the 
President has only some of the executive powers.23  This strategy is of-
ten adopted at the state level, where the Attorney General is inde-
pendent of the Governor.24 
There is little doubt that this division is the source of some pro-
found consequences, as the investigative power of the Attorney Gen-
eral is often more aggressively pursued in these contexts.  One need 
think only of such notable (and controversial) Attorneys General as 
Eliot Spitzer of New York to see how far this can go. 
Whether this division of power makes sense is hard to say.  It is 
clear that part of the impulse for creating special prosecutors not sub-
ject to the direct control of the President rested on the perception 
that presidential control over the office of the Attorney General 
raised a conflict of interest that made it difficult to investigate poten-
 
 22 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 48 (James Madison) (arguing that separation of powers requires 
empowering the legislative, executive, and judicial branches to exercise constitutional 
control over each other); see also GERHARD CASPER, SEPARATING POWER:  ESSAYS ON THE 
FOUNDING PERIOD 1–22 (1997) (providing an overview of the separation of powers doc-
trine and arguing for its flexible application). 
 23 See Christopher R. Berry & Jacob E. Gersen, The Unbundled Executive, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1385, 1386 (2008) (theorizing that vesting various executive powers in several directly 
elected executive officials would yield better-perfoming executives). 
 24 See id. (“Most states directly elect state attorneys general . . . .”). 
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tial illegalities in the executive branch.25  Yet the failure of the institu-
tion of the Independent Counsel speaks of a second lesson, which is 
that uncontrolled individuals holding investigative power could 
themselves engage in abusive investigations as well, which, in large 
measure, is why the office died for political reasons in 1999. 
Yet historically, the American Constitution did not take that path.  
Instead, it concentrated all executive power in a single official and, in 
response, sought to build a structure that makes sensible adjustments 
in order to take into account its novel vesting provisions.  Its most 
conspicuous feature is that the President is subject to limitations on 
the content of his duty, that is, to take care that the law be faithfully 
executed.  Some instances require a performance, often discretion-
ary, by other individuals in the executive branch—note the role of 
the word “be” in this formulation—whose charges are given to them 
by Congress, not by the President. 
This formal limitation on presidential power is not easy to enforce 
in light of the inevitable disputes of what is required by the law that 
the President must execute.  There are some black and white com-
mands, but even before the rise of the modern administrative state, 
government officials necessarily had to discharge discretionary func-
tions.  That was why Chief Justice Marshall took such pains to note in 
Marbury v. Madison that the writ of mandamus did not apply to those 
circumstances—a holding that remains good law to the present day.26 
Faced with the challenge of control, the Constitution veered off 
into unexplored territory by introducing a powerful limitation:  that 
the President’s appointment of key senior officials must be approved 
by the Senate—a restriction that is rejected in all corporate and par-
liamentary systems.  A striking feature of this system of rejection is 
that it is done through a straight majority vote.  There is no “for 
cause” requirement that the Senate must invoke to explain why it re-
fuses to issue its consent.  This is surely a commendable design fea-
ture given the initial structural decision to allow the President to 
serve for a fixed term of four years.  The Senate is a collective body 
 
 25 In Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 660 (1988), the Court upheld the constitutionality of 
independent counsel provision of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978.  Justice Scalia is-
sued a prescient dissent, arguing that the provision violates the separation of powers doc-
trine by authorizing Congress to demand the Attorney General to investigate alleged ex-
ecutive branch misconduct.  See id. at 703 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Congress has effectively 
compelled a criminal investigation of a high-level appointee of the President in connec-
tion with his actions arising out of a bitter dispute between the President and the Legisla-
tive Branch.”). 
 26 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803) (stating that courts do not have authority to question 
how executive officers perform discretionary duties). 
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and reasons that appeal to some members may not be persuasive to 
others.  Each Senator can speak his or her own piece on the subject 
before or after the vote is taken.  Any effort to cobble together some 
public standard to decide the “for cause” question would fall prey to 
the inanities of public deliberation by making it hard to reject some-
one without seeking to defame his character or fitness to serve as a 
public official.  Disagreements in policy are not precluded in this 
context as a matter of law.  The extent to which these are acted upon 
by individual Senators, or indeed by the Senate as a whole, is a ques-
tion for political wisdom—sometimes in short supply—and not for 
legal oversight.  The use of the advice and consent standard thus cre-
ates a wide space for soft institutional practices. 
Nor is the American Constitution unique on this particularity.  
The College of Cardinals also chooses the Pope by majority vote, cast 
without explanation.  The advantage of the President in any tug of 
war with the Senate lies in his ability to win over enough members of 
the Senate to have his way, no questions asked.  Sooner or later the 
positions will be filled, and, if not, the interim appointments are left 
to the President, which gives him a not-so-subtle advantage over the 
Senate.27 
This rigid system of senatorial approval applies only to senior offi-
cers of the government.  As with all organizations, the question of 
who fills the non-policy positions is far less weighty and, on this ques-
tion, Congress is entitled to diminish the power of its Senate:  “the 
Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, 
as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or 
in the Heads of Departments.”28  It is worth noting that the relaxation 
of control is not for the Senate to do on its own, but for both Houses 
to accomplish together “by Law,” which is subject to the President’s 
veto.29 
This cessation of power is not a one-way ratchet.  Presumably, any 
statute that offers power to the President could be repealed, subject 
to a presidential veto and its override.  In addition, these second-tier 
appointments necessarily add an extra layer of complexity to the the-
ory of the unitary executive.  The Congress can choose to vest these 
 
 27 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3 (“The President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies 
that may happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall 
expire at the End of their next Session.”). 
 28 Id. at cl. 2. 
 29 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (“Every bill which shall have passed the House of Repre-
sentatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the President of 
the United States . . . .”). 
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powers in the heads of departments30 that can exercise them without 
the approval or cooperation of the President, or in the courts that en-
joy by design a very large measure of independence from the political 
branches.  This subappointment clause, as it were, thus permits the 
Congress to dial up or dial down its powers relative to the other 
branches.  The mass of confirmations that is routinely required, and 
often delayed, provides some evidence that Congress—or at least the 
Senate—does not wish to surrender its power easily, even at the cost 
of diminishing the effectiveness of key appointments who operate 
only with provisional authority.31 
At the same time, the creation of an independent civil service that 
is not answerable to the President fits only uneasily in the constitu-
tional scheme, to say the least.  The independence of the civil service 
was stoutly defended by Chief Justice Taft in Myers v. United States as a 
correction against the “spoils system,” which allowed the victorious 
candidate to displace all rank and file employees of the previous ad-
ministration.32  But that entire institutional arrangement, however 
wise, looks insecure when set against the constitutional text.  The first 
point of uncertainty is who counts as an “inferior officer.”  The oppo-
sition to their “superior officers” (a term never used in the Constitu-
tion) seems clear enough.  But the term “officer” itself suggests only a 
subclass of all government employees who are not senior officials.  By 
way of analogy, the inferior officers of a corporation do not include 
the receptionists or the custodial staffs, given their total absence of 
policy-making functions.33  For those persons, it looks as though the 
Appointments Clause has nothing to say at all, which leaves open the 
question as to who exercises authority in the appointment and termi-
nation of executive branch employees who do not rise up to the level 
of officers.  On this question, the mystery only deepens when we look 
at the matter through the lens of the Necessary and Proper Clause, 
which grants Congress the power “[t]o make all Laws which shall be 
 
 30 Notably, no departments are specified by name in the Constitution. 
 31 For an exhaustive account of the difficulties in staffing key agency positions today, see 
Anne Joseph O’Connell, Vacant Offices:  Delays in Staffing Top Agency Positions, 82 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 913 (2009) (noting the difficulties in filling the 1,100 positions that now require Se-
nate confirmation in both the executive branch and independent agencies). 
 32 272 U.S. 52, 173–74 (1926) (defending the President’s unchecked power to remove civil 
officers as being consistent with a merit system). 
 33 For a private law comparison, see Rules and Regulations Under the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-1(f) (2009) (“The term ‘officer’ shall mean an issuer’s 
president, principal financial officer, principal accounting officer (or, if there is no such 
accounting officer, the controller), any vice-president of the issuer in charge of a princi-
pal business unit, division or function (such as sales, administration or finance), . . . or 
any other person who performs similar policy-making functions for the issuer.”). 
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necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Pow-
ers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Govern-
ment of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.”34 
This Clause clearly authorizes Congress to allow the President to 
hire employees at all levels to staff the executive branch, for how else 
could he discharge his duties?  But it is a different question as to 
whether it authorizes Congress to impose civil service requirements 
on these employees, for it is far from apparent how these restrictions 
work to assist the President “for carrying into Execution” any of his 
constitutional powers.  To the contrary, the Necessary and Proper 
Clause looks to be a limitation on that ability, for why is it appropriate 
for Congress to intrude in the internal affairs of the executive 
branch?35  The expansive reading that is given to the Clause usually 
relates to congressional powers to regulate or create, as it did with the 
national bank at issue in McCulloch.  That case did not involve con-
gressional encroachment on the executive branch.  At stake was “on-
ly” the expansion of federal powers relative to the states.  But inter-
branch encroachment comes to the fore when the Necessary and 
Proper Clause is invoked to rebalance powers between the branches 
of the federal government. 
Given that no enumerated power authorizes Congress to regulate 
the internal affairs of the executive branch, just where does Congress 
get the power to impose a civil service system on executive branch 
operations?  If anything, it looks as though there is an implicit con-
gressional duty to authorize payment for (at least some) employees in 
the executive branch, regardless of how the President chooses to or-
ganize it.  After all, if Congress did not authorize the hiring of any 
executive branch employees at all, the entire government could come 
crashing down.  Once again, the unarticulated gaps in the Constitu-
tion scheme loom as large as its explicit provisions, which is why a 
close analysis leaves the Civil Service Act36 in some kind of structural 
limbo, notwithstanding Chief Justice Taft’s protestations to the con-
trary.  The lesson is clear:  the harder we push on matters of govern-
ment structure, the less guidance that we can wring out of the Consti-
 
 34 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
 35 The standard view of this clause is that “necessary and proper” should be translated as 
“appropriate.”  See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 356 (1819) (stating 
that Congress was given powers that are “useful and appropriate” to enforce the specific, 
articulated powers it was given).  For a devastating critique, see Gary Lawson & Patricia B. 
Granger, The “Proper” Scope of Federal Power:  A Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping 
Clause, 43 DUKE L.J. 267, 326–30 (1993) (stressing the word “proper” as a denial of dele-
gated power). 
 36 Act of Jan. 16, 1883, ch. 27, 22 Stat. 403 (regulating the civil service of the United States). 
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tution’s text.  Chief Justice Taft carried the day not because of his su-
perior textual arguments, but because his presidential aura legiti-
mated the strong critique of the spoils system that led to the adoption 
of the Civil Service Act.  Such is the complexity of the underlying or-
ganizational problem that it is hard to make any confident global as-
sessment about how well these reforms have fared. 
Nor is there anything that dispels the murk when the discussion 
turns to the status of the inferior officers.  Although Congress has the 
power to decide who shall make the appointment, the Constitution is 
once again silent on the question of removal.  If it is regarded as in-
herent in the President’s “take care” powers that he be able to re-
move his chief, or superior, officers at will, why does that removal 
power not remain with the President, or the heads of the depart-
ments as the case may be, when legislation provides that Senate con-
firmation is not required?  The case law on this subject emphatically 
states that Congress can pass laws that require the Senate’s consent 
for removal in these positions.37 
United States v. Perkins raised the question of whether the plaintiff, 
a cadet engineer, could be dismissed by the Secretary of the Navy 
when his services were no longer required.38  Perkins explicitly passed 
on the question of whether the Senate could restrict the removal of 
officers who were appointed only with its advice and consent, and 
continued as follows: 
We have no doubt that when Congress, by law, vests the appointment 
of inferior officers in the heads of Departments it may limit and restrict 
the power of removal as it deems best for the public interest.  The consti-
tutional authority in Congress to thus vest the appointment implies au-
thority to limit, restrict, and regulate the removal by such laws as Con-
gress may enact in relation to the officers so appointed. 
The head of a Department has no constitutional prerogative of ap-
pointment to offices independently of the legislation of Congress, and by 
such legislation he must be governed, not only in making appointments 
but in all that is incident thereto.39 
This argument relies heavily on the greater/lesser power argu-
ment that works well in ordinary business situations:  the power to 
decide whether or not to make an offer gives the offeror the power to 
 
 37 See, e.g., United States v. Perkins, 116 U.S. 483, 485 (1886) (holding that Congress has 
constitutional authority to regulate the removal of inferior officers). 
 38 Id. at 483. 
 39 Id. at 485 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 1, at 
214–15 (asserting that the holding of Perkins “makes eminent good sense as applied to the 
removal power of heads of departments”). 
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impose conditions on that offer.40  Without this principle, it is not 
possible to develop ordinary commerce in competitive markets.  But 
by the same token, this full-throated version of freedom of contract 
does not work where either private parties or governments exercise 
monopoly power, as they so often do.  The power to exclude from the 
roads does not include the lesser power to reserve their use only to 
Republicans or Democrats, men or women, even if it does allow the 
state to require parties to a road accident to submit to its resolution 
within the jurisdiction where it takes place.41  And the same set of im-
plicit limitations apply to structural issues.  The power to confirm or 
reject a nominee to the Supreme Court, for example, does not confer 
on the Senate the power to appoint a nominee to that seat on condi-
tion that he or she refuse to participate in antitrust or affirmative ac-
tion cases.  Repeated application of conditional approvals will gut the 
operational capacities of any appointment.  The decision is necessar-
ily an all-or-nothing choice, for otherwise the separation of powers is 
at an end. 
That same risk of interbranch encroachment arises in Perkins.  It 
makes no sense to hold that Congress, through legislation, cannot 
limit the President’s power of removal for officers that are appointed 
through the confirmation process, but that it can (even over a presi-
dential veto) prevent the President and his key appointees from re-
moving at will inferior employees without the consent of the Senate, 
or indeed the House of Representatives as well.  Congress’s ability to 
either allow or force the President to make appointments without 
Senate confirmation does not allow Congress to strip him of the pow-
er of removal of inferior officers, whose cooperation is needed to 
make the executive branch respond to his wishes.  There is no appar-
ent reason why Congress can unilaterally increase its powers at the 
back end by reducing them at the front. 
It is no response, moreover, to say that the removal power does 
not matter because the decisions of inferior officers can generally be 
overridden by their superior officers through the normal chain of 
command.  That claim is idle when an inferior officer is entitled to 
keep his post, as in Perkins.  Nor does that response address the situa-
tion where Congress vests particular powers in discrete officers within 
the executive branch other than the President.  It has long been set-
tled, for example, that the Congress may pass legislation that confers 
 
 40 For my extensive discussion, see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE 
(1993). 
 41 See generally id. at 161–70. 
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certain powers on the Secretary of the Treasury that the President 
cannot exercise in his personal capacity.  Thus in the famous dispute 
over the Bank of the United States, President Andrew Jackson did not 
have the power to withdraw federal funds from the Bank; nor did he 
have the power to order the Secretary of the Treasury to do so.  But 
he did have the power to remove any Secretary of Treasury who re-
fused to do so, and to appoint, but only with the advice and consent 
of the Senate, someone else to do his bidding.  Accordingly, Jackson 
fired first Louis McLane and then William Duane before he ap-
pointed Roger Taney, who was prepared to do his bidding.42  Against 
that backdrop it seems highly unlikely that Congress would vest pow-
ers in inferior officers in ways that bypass the President altogether.  It 
is almost a contradiction in terms to say that neither the President 
nor any of his senior officers are empowered either to give direct or-
ders to subordinates or to remove them from office, without the con-
sent of the Senate, or even the entire Congress.  Any purported insu-
lation of so-called inferior officers counts as a complete inversion of 
the constitutional hierarchy that subordinates key aspects of execu-
tive power to the will of Congress.  If Congress wants to reassert some 
control over inferior officials, let it repeal any legislation that allows 
these appointments to be made by the senior executive branch offi-
cials acting on their own.  Otherwise the doctrine of unconstitutional 
conditions, which emerged after Perkins was decided, undermines the 
soundness of that decision. 
II.  THE BREAKDOWN OF THE ORIGINAL SYSTEM 
Thus far I have concentrated on the role of the removal power in 
its relationship to the appointment power of the President under the 
original constitutional design.  The second part of the problem asks 
how well the unitary executive survives in modern times.  At this 
point, the issue is not one of textual interpretation of the key points 
in Article II.  Rather the issue is what pressures are placed on the re-
moval power against the background of other major changes in our 
constitutional system wrought during and since the tumultuous 
1930s.  On this score, it is quite clear that modern times demand, 
 
 42 For discussion, see Peter L. Strauss, Overseer, or “The Decider”?  The President in Administra-
tive Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696, 705–07 (2007).  I think that Strauss overreads this 
history in thinking that it supplies any textual support for the constitutional legitimacy of 
independent agencies.  See Richard A. Epstein, Why the Modern Administrative State Is Incon-
sistent with the Rule of Law, 3 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 491, 503 (2008) (“The creation of the 
independent administrative body . . . will increase the size and power of the administra-
tive state in ways that classical liberals would find unacceptable.”). 
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even in the most modest of circumstances, a size of the federal gov-
ernment far larger and more complex than any contemplated by the 
Framers.  Simple increases in population and in the number of states 
are themselves sufficient to drive that result.  And these effects are in 
turn compounded by the huge expansion in the scope of federal 
power through the New Deal interpretation of the Commerce Clause. 
These changes matter because the Constitution does not create a 
set of institutional arrangements for allocating federal authority that 
are easily scalable.  It is not as though all of the basic relationships in 
the original Constitution remain constant when the government it 
creates repeatedly doubles and redoubles in size.  Stated otherwise, 
what might be an efficient distribution of power for a small govern-
ment turns out to be an overrigid distribution of power for an ex-
panded state.  As constitutional amendments are hard to come by, 
the adjustments in question are made by judicial accommodations 
that sometimes make sense, but sometimes do not.  To show this 
problem, it is worthwhile to take a small digression to deal with one 
issue at the line between congressional and executive power, which is 
the impeachment process within Congress, where the scale issues 
have imposed stress on the original constitutional framework.  The-
reafter, it is useful to see how the problem of expanded government 
size and mission puts added stress on the original system of separa-
tion of powers, all of which deal with various questions of delegation 
that increase the number of ways in which the federal government 
can act.  Some of these involve delegations of powers to Article I 
courts and to administrative agencies.  The former does not properly 
speaking involve the executive branch, but it must be explored as a 
counterpoint to the key issue on executive power, namely the delega-
tion of authority to administrative agencies, which manifestly does.  
Thereafter, the analysis concludes with a discussion of congressional 
delegations to the President, in order to develop some working ex-
planation of the distribution of issues between the executive branch 
proper and the independent administrative agencies. 
A.  Impeachment 
The practices governing impeachment offer an instructive way to 
look at the scale problem.  When the legislature has few matters to 
consider, members of the House and Senate can make a pretense of 
keeping up with the work.  But as the number of matters increase, it 
becomes ever more necessary to reduce the amount of work that is 
done by each house as a whole and, necessarily, to increase the 
amount of work that is delegated first to committee, and then to 
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committee staffers.  In many instances, this process simply looks like a 
reorganization of workload that was contemplated by the Constitu-
tion, which wisely left each house the master of its own internal gov-
ernance.  But in some instances, the efforts at delegation run up 
against constitutional limitations.  Thus on matters of impeachment 
of judicial officials, for example, one question is whether the trial has 
to be before the Senate as a whole.  The text itself provides that: 
The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments.  When sit-
ting for that Purpose, they shall be on Oath or Affirmation.  When the 
President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside:  
And no Person shall be convicted without the Concurrence of two thirds 
of the Members present.43 
The common procedure today in routine impeachments for fed-
eral judges is to allow the heavy work to be decided by a committee, 
which then refers the matter out to the full Senate for a vote.  But this 
hardly seems to meet the standards set out in the Constitution, for 
the Senate does not seem to be “sitting for that Purpose” when many 
of its members are excluded from the deliberations.  The last sen-
tence of this Clause does not require every Senator to be present, re-
quiring that the impeachment takes place with the concurrence of 
the vote of two thirds of present members (which means that staying 
away in protest reduces the number of votes needed to secure the 
conviction).  Yet by the same token, the sentence seems to suggest 
that all Senators have the right to be present, which is not the case 
when the initial vetting of the case is reserved to a committee.  The 
same conclusion comes from an ordinary reading of the term “try.”  A 
court would not be sitting for the purposes of a case if most of the 
judges who were responsible for issuing its ruling never heard the 
oral argument.  Only in very limited circumstances can appellate 
judges participate in cases where they were not present at oral argu-
ment.  And it is unheard of to allow district court judges to try cases 
in absentia.  So it looks as though all Senators should have the right 
to participate in the proceedings. 
That system, which might have worked well with thirty Senators 
and modest amounts of business, is not likely to work at all today.  So 
when the issue came to a head in Nixon v. United States, the Supreme 
Court solemnly pronounced the matter a political question,44 which 
was a polite way of saying that, on this occasion at least, it adopted the 
narrow view of Marbury v. Madison, under which the Court would not 
 
 43 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6. 
 44 506 U.S. 224, 235 (1993) (“Judicial involvement in impeachment proceedings, even if 
only for purposes of judicial review, is counterintuitive . . . .”). 
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interfere with the internal operations of a coordinate branch of gov-
ernment.45  In this instance, the strategy of nonintervention worked 
well, because once the impeachment is done with, its results do not 
influence any structural interaction with the two other branches of 
government.  But for a conscientious Senator, nothing turns on the 
refusal of the Supreme Court to interpret the meaning of the phrase 
“try impeachment;” it does not end the inquiry into the constitution-
ality of the Senate’s procedures, which should have led to the same 
interpretive result:  the Senate has to sit as a court of the whole to 
hear the case.  But the functional arguments proved in the end too 
strong as the full Senate cannot operate coherently in that manner, 
constantly forcing matters on lesser bodies.  The modern practice 
should sit well for functionalists, but not for originalists, and for the 
same reason.  We have here a set of changed circumstances, without 
any obvious political valence, that renders the older procedures sus-
pect precisely because they are not scalable. 
The same kind of issue applies with respect to the executive 
branch, which under the current Constitution is asked to discharge 
countless tasks that were not in the contemplation of the Framers.  
The vast increase in the scale of its operation requires a huge expan-
sion in its personnel, and a concomitant increase in the level of dis-
cretion it exercises.  Cabining the executive branch in its original 
form would therefore impose enormous span of control problems on 
its operation.  If the executive were to implement the broad man-
dates characteristic of the welfare state, it would also work to increase 
the power of the President vis-à-vis the Congress.  Indeed, in large 
part the creation of independent agencies, which are said to fall with-
in the executive branch, was an effort to prevent that shift in power 
by limiting the power of the President to remove agency members 
from office without some showing of cause. 
Historically, these tensions manifested themselves in connection 
with the organization of the judicial power.  On this score, the battle-
ground is set by the explicit provisions of Article III that stipulate that 
all federal judges shall have lifetime tenure—technically on good be-
havior—and that their salary cannot be diminished within their term 
of office.46  It takes little imagination to realize that even as the base of 
the pyramid continues to expand almost without end, the top of the 
pyramid consists of one Supreme Court that cannot keep up with the 
volume of work below, no matter how energetic it becomes.  Yet there 
 
 45 See 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 46 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
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is real resistance to following the practices of other courts, which 
would allow the Supreme Court (at least in nonconstitutional cases) 
to sit in panels, for fear that the composition of the panel will have a 
powerful influence on the direction of the law.  These immense prac-
tical pressures are born, in part, of deep structural transformations 
and in equal measure of short-term political concerns. 
It is no mystery why the entire enterprise is fraught with such dif-
ficulty.  Figuring out these twists and turns with the creation of such 
constitutional oxymorons as independent agencies in the executive 
branch that are “quasi-legislative” and “quasi-judicial” is the next task 
of this Article.47  The first section traces the expansion of the govern-
ment powers at state levels to set the stage for the similar transforma-
tion at the federal level.  Thereafter, it is necessary to look at relations 
across all three branches to develop some understanding of the trans-
formation of the position of the executive, and the unilateral power 
of removal.  The second section then examines the complexities of 
the commission model at the federal level in connection with both 
Article I courts and independent agencies, and concludes with a dis-
cussion of the complex interactions between Congress and the execu-
tive branch. 
B.  State and Federal Commissions 
The structure of expanded government is not unique to the fed-
eral level, for a parallel expansion in government also took place at 
the state level, whose actions were unencumbered by the limitations 
found in the federal constitution.  As the states expanded their activi-
ties in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, they relied 
on a wide range of new and specialized institutions.  These actions 
did not go unopposed.  Perhaps the most famous example of judicial 
resistance was Ives v. South Buffalo Railway Co.,48 which represented a 
confused effort to invoke common law notions of tort liability to 
strike down the initial New York Workmen’s Compensation Act un-
der state constitutional law.  The New York statute in its original form 
did not make use of any specialized commission to hear these cases, 
so that the case raised no structural issues at the state level.49  These 
 
 47 These terms are found in Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935), which 
described the FTC as “neither political nor executive, but predominantly quasi-judicial 
and quasi-legislative.”  Id. at 624. 
 48 94 N.E. 431 (N.Y. 1911). 
 49 See New York Labor Law of 1910, art. 14a, § 219d, quoted in Ives, 94 N.E. at 435 (stating 
that a dispute over workers’ compensation could be settled through the common law 
court system). 
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objections largely rested on uneasiness with the displacement of the 
traditional common law standards of liability.  New York promptly 
amended its constitution to allow for this innovation, which was 
promptly challenged under the United States Constitution, where it 
was upheld against takings and due process challenges in New York 
Central Railroad Co. v. White.50 
White had nothing to say about the use of specialized compensa-
tion commissions at the state level.  That structural question surfaced 
in 1932 when the constitutionality of the Longshoremen’s and Har-
bor Workers’ Compensation Act came before the Supreme Court in 
Crowell v. Benson.51  Within our system of federal powers, could a 
workmen’s compensation commission be established to decide these 
cases?  The federal challenge was whether the Act conferred judicial 
power on a nonjudicial body.  The early learning on this subject ap-
peared to state that all judicial powers had to remain with the courts, 
and no other powers could be conferred on them.52  To be sure, by 
the time Crowell was decided, the austere regime of Murray’s Lessee v. 
Hoboken Land & Improvement Co. had already been eroded with the 
inexorable expansion of the administrative state.  Murray’s Lessee had 
recognized a limited exception to its sharp departmentalism in cases 
of “[e]quitable claims to land by the inhabitants of ceded territo-
ries,”53 which is best explained by the highly politicized nature of any 
dispute that necessarily involves land titles derived from grants by the 
United States.54 
By 1932, however, the definition of a public right had expanded 
to accommodate the reality of the new administrative state.  Crowell 
involved a specialized federal workmen’s compensation scheme.  
Chief Justice Hughes’s rationale for sustaining these commissions 
had no modest goal:  it was intended to legitimate the full range of 
specialized institutional arrangements that had developed since the 
 
 50 243 U.S. 188, 209 (1917) (holding that the exclusive workers’ compensation system cre-
ated under the New York Workmen’s Compensation Law of 1913 was constitutional). 
 51 285 U.S. 22 (1932). 
 52 See Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 284 
(1856) (“To avoid misconstruction upon so grave a subject, we think it proper to state 
that we do not consider congress can either withdraw from judicial cognizance any matter 
which, from its nature, is the subject of a suit at the common law, or in equity, or admi-
ralty; nor, on the other hand, can it bring under the judicial power a matter which, from 
its nature, is not a subject for judicial determination.”). 
 53 Id. 
 54 For such a case, see Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).  The case cited in 
Murray’s Lessee was Foley v. Harrison, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 433 (1853), which involved grants 
of federal lands to each of the states for internal improvements.  See Murray’s Lessee, 59 
U.S. at 284. 
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passage of the Interstate Commerce Act in 1887, including, most no-
tably, the Interstate Commerce Commission.  Public rights thus in-
cluded such matters as “foreign commerce, taxation, immigration, 
the public lands, public health, the facilities of the post office, pen-
sions and payments to veterans.”55  All of these issues could be 
brought before administrative tribunals without question.  But the 
ordinary workers’ compensation dispute turned on money owed for 
workplace injuries, which could not simply be removed from the Ar-
ticle III courts by fiat.  At this point, Chief Justice Hughes adopted an 
inelegant compromise whereby the basic jurisdictional facts in any 
admiralty case—did the dispute occur at a location covered by courts 
of admiralty, and was the accident one that arose out of the course of 
that admiralty jurisdiction?—were subject to de novo review in fed-
eral court.  On the other hand, questions on the extent of injury and 
level of compensation could be decided exclusively within the com-
mission because no jurisdictional issues were implicated. 
It is important to recall how this hairsplitting came to pass by re-
verting to the basic issue of the tripartite constitutional structure in a 
world where the effectiveness of the judicial system is heavily depend-
ent on size.  When the public administrative load is small, separation 
of powers works pretty well.  But the huge expansion in government 
power makes it hard to ramp up the system to meet the additional 
load.  Commissions are a sensible way of getting many of the cases out 
of the judicial system.  The logic for doing this within the framework 
of the federal government is equivalent to the logic for doing it 
within the states.  And once the states took that path, why deny that 
option to the federal government?  As the size of the federal district 
courts expands, the pressure rises to expand the size or number of 
the courts of appeals.  But there is no similar adjustment at the top, 
as the number of Supreme Courts is frozen at one, no matter how 
may rivers feed into it. 
On this point, the stakes in Crowell were in fact higher than the 
new compensation commissions due to two other noteworthy devel-
opments.  The first of these is the rise of Article I courts, in which 
some element of the judicial power is vested in judges who do not 
have life tenure and who cannot, therefore, be located in Article III 
courts.  Tax court and bankruptcy court judges fall under that de-
scription and their appointments are for long, but limited, terms—
 
 55 Crowell, 285 U.S. at 51. 
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fifteen years for the tax court56 and fourteen years for the bankruptcy 
court.  The second concerns the rise of independent administrative 
agencies that fit nowhere within the current tripartite system. 
C.  Article I Courts 
The United States Tax Court began life as the U.S. Board of Tax 
Appeals under the Revenue Act of 1924.57  Its creation was marked by 
a sustained terminological effort to insulate these courts from consti-
tutional attack.  That is why the Tax Board of Appeals was originally 
staffed with “members,” not “judges”—a state of affairs that lasted un-
til the Revenue Act of 1942,58 which upgraded the low-status Board 
into the Tax Court of the United States, whose members were up-
graded to “judges,” and whose chairman became the “Presiding 
Judge.” 
The Bankruptcy Courts also traveled on a long and complex path, 
culminating in the passage of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.59 
The 1898 Bankruptcy Act created the new office of bankruptcy refe-
ree.60  These referees were appointed by district court judges and 
served for two-year terms, subject to removal at any time.  Referees 
had final word on administrative matters, but their substantive deci-
sions were subject to review by the district court judges who ap-
pointed them.  By 1946, their term of office had extended to six 
years, and the transformation to bankruptcy judges was completed in 
the 1978 Reform Act, when the traditional administrative functions 
were split off and turned over to the Department of Justice. 
The 1978 Bankruptcy Act was conscious of the Article I difficulty, 
which it sought to meet as follows.  For the core functions of bank-
ruptcy, broadly defined, the only appeal from a bankruptcy court is to 
the courts of appeals.  Noncore functions are subject to de novo re-
view in the district courts on the theory that, historically, they have no 
 
 56 See Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 900, 43 Stat. 253, 336.  The difference between a tri-
bunal and court is that tribunals are usually charged with adjudication for some specific 
incident only, after which they are disbanded. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 504(a), Pub. L. No. 77-753, 56 Stat. 798, 957. 
 59 See generally Prudence Beatty Abram & Andrew DeNatale, From Referee in Bankruptcy to 
Bankruptcy Judge:  A Century of Change in the Second Circuit, in THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
BANKRUPTCY & REORGANIZATION LAW IN THE COURTS OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT OF THE 
UNITED STATES 61 (U.S. Courts for the Second Circuit Comm. on History & Commemo-
rative Events ed., 1995); Fed. Judicial Ctr., Federal Judicial History:  Bankruptcy Referees, 
http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/referees_bdy (last visited Jan. 29, 2010). 
 60 Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 1, § 1(a)(21), 30 Stat. 544, 545. 
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special expertise that justifies their elevation to Article I status.61  The 
direct de novo review in district court shows the influence of Crowell, 
because an Article III court would be able to review the entire matter.  
The fix should not work, given that bankruptcy courts also discharge 
a wide array of functions that normally fall to courts of first instance 
under Article III. 
It is understandable, therefore, that the 1978 Act was held uncon-
stitutional in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line 
Co.62  Textually, it is hard to find a principled defense of these oxymo-
ronic Article I courts.  The ostensible authority for creating these 
bodies is found in Article I, Section 8, Clause 9, which gives Congress 
the power “to constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court.”  
The term “tribunal” appears only in one place in the Constitution, 
where it assumes a critical role.  The basic structure of Article III calls 
for the creation of the Supreme Court.  It also allows for the creation 
of whatever inferior courts the Congress shall ordain and establish.  
Article I, Section 8, Clause 9 authorizes Congress to create those 
courts.  Without it, Congress does not have any explicit power in Arti-
cle I to fill out the federal system.  To the extent, therefore, that this 
provision is the only source of legislative authority for creating tax or 
bankruptcy courts, it gives no shelter to those who want to free these 
courts from the restrictions found in Article III. 
To be sure, the term “tribunal” sometimes refers in popular 
speech to bodies that are brought into existence to deal with some 
short term problem, after which they are disbanded.  One such body 
was the War Claims Commission, formed in 1948 to deal with com-
pensation claims for internees, prisoners, and religious organizations 
at the conclusion of World War II.  That Commission had to wrap up 
its business within three years after the close of its filing period.63  
This Commission (which does not use the word “tribunal”) has the 
twin hallmarks of limited duration and specialized docket.  In these 
cases, an argument can be made that the commission “members”—a 
replay of the verbal strategy adopted with the Board of Tax Appeals—
need not be federal judges with lifetime tenure.  It can be persons 
who are appointed by the President (and in the case of the War 
 
 61 For discussion of the structure of bankruptcy law, see Chapter 1 of DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, 
THE ELEMENTS OF BANKRUPTCY (rev. ed. 1993). 
 62 458 U.S. 50, 87 (1982). 
 63 See War Claims Act of 1948, ch. 826, § 2(d), 62 Stat. 1240, 1241 (“The Commission shall 
wind up its affairs at the earliest practicable time after the expiration of the time for filing 
claims, but in no event later than three years after the expiration of such time.”). 
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Claims Commission, confirmed by the Senate) for the duration of the 
Commission itself. 
These specialized commissions were, and are, created in response 
to a serious peak-load problem.  It is unwise to appoint lots of addi-
tional federal judges to handle this overload when the burden will be 
over in a couple of years.  It does not follow, however, that there is no 
restraint on the staffing of these bodies.  It would have been unac-
ceptable, for example, to allow the appointment of commissioners for 
one-year terms, subject to renewal, given the obvious threat to judicial 
independence.  That said, it is hard to shoehorn either the tax or the 
bankruptcy courts into any narrow short-term tribunal exception to 
lifetime tenure for federal judges, assuming that it properly exists.  
The brute fact is that both courts are a permanent feature of our ju-
dicial landscape.  Once any tribunal becomes perpetual, terminology 
does not matter:  the terms of its judges or members should be for 
life under Article III.  Otherwise, district courts could have their work 
siphoned off into tribunals until the requirements of Article III be-
come a dead letter, as we have specialized bodies to deal with gov-
ernment claims, patents, copyrights, condemnations, communica-
tions, labor, and so on down the line. 
As an originalist matter, therefore, the answer seems clear:  we 
cannot have these specialized tribunals exist outside of Article III.  
But there they sit, and the question to ask is whether the harm is so 
great that one should seek to undo the damage.  On this score, some 
weight has to be attached to the soundness of the initial provision 
and the nature of the subsequent incursion.  Instructively, Article I 
judges are all guaranteed their compensation during their term of of-
fice, and for obvious reasons.  The sticking point involves de facto life 
tenure for federal judges on good behavior.  The Constitution incor-
porated this provision, like the compensation provision, in order to 
ensure the independence of judges from encroachment by the other 
two branches.  That end is highly laudable, but the constitutional 
choice of means has turned out to be, in my judgment, highly flawed.  
Not surprisingly, it has been subject to all sorts of powerful criticisms 
and evasions.64  Life tenure allows senile judges to sit on the court in 
their dotage, and it goes against the principle of rotation which 
brings fresh blood into public offices.  A system that allowed judges to 
work until some specified retirement age—say, seventy years of age—
 
 64 For some sense of the widespread dissatisfaction with the current system, see Terri L. Per-
etti, Promoting Equity in the Distribution of Supreme Court Appointments, in REFORMING THE 
COURT:  TERM LIMITS FOR SUPREME COURT JUSTICES 435 (Roger C. Cramton & Paul D. 
Carrington eds., 2006). 
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or which restricts them to long-term appointments—say, fifteen 
years—goes a long way to preserve independence while avoiding the 
risks associated with (de facto) lifetime tenure. 
It is, of course, no accident that many state courts have moved to 
systems of this sort.  And it is no quiet irony that the maximum age 
limit for state court judges has been subject to the (dubious) claim 
that it violates the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act.65  
At bottom, however, imposing term limits for these other judges 
counts as an unambiguous improvement on the original constitutional 
scheme, which now comes at the price of doctrinal impurity.  But no 
one claims that these developments create systemic risks, even if they 
oppose the division across different classes of federal judges, given 
the high level of independence that these judges retain. 
D.  Independent Agencies 
Side by side with the rise of Article I judges is the validation of in-
dependent administrative agencies whose members do not serve at 
the will of the President.  The use of administrative agencies started, 
of course, with the passage of the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, 
but the issue did not come to a head in the Supreme Court until the 
decision in Humphrey’s Executor v. United States.66  In 1914, Congress es-
tablished the Federal Trade Commission as part of Woodrow Wilson’s 
general reform efforts to control “unfair methods of competition.”67  
The members of that panel were removable only for-cause, or more 
precisely, “for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.”68  
Justice Sutherland upheld the statutory language, distinguishing 
Myers on the ground that it dealt with “purely executive officers,” and 
thus did not extend to FTC Commissioners who are not executive 
department officials at all, but who act “quasi-legislatively and in part 
quasi-judicially.”69  So the question then arises, just where are they lo-
cated?  If they are not executive branch officials, then by elimination 
they must belong to either the legislative or judicial branch.  Yet both 
of these suggestions can be dismissed out of hand.  Administrators 
have not been elected to their offices, and are not members of the 
 
 65 See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 484–85 (1991) (holding that the ADEA did not 
bind the states with respect to its own employees in the absence of a clear statement to 
that effect).  For my defense of that position, see Richard A. Epstein, Mandatory Retirement 
for Supreme Court Justices, in REFORMING THE COURT, supra note 64, at 415. 
 66 295 U.S. 602 (1935). 
 67 Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2006). 
 68 Id. § 4l. 
 69 Humphrey’s Executor, 295 U.S. at 627–28. 
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House or Senate.  And they are certainly not judges with lifetime ten-
ure.  So we thus created a fourth branch of government, with no con-
stitutional pedigree to handle the distinctive mixture of duties of an 
FTC commissioner.  Yet once the dam breaks, imitation follows as a 
matter of course.  Thus, for example, the National Labor Relations 
Act created a board of three members, serving for a term of five years 
each, with its chairman designated by the President.70 
As an originalist matter, the case against independent administra-
tive agencies is at least as strong as the case against Article I judges:  
neither has a constitutional home.  It might be tempting, therefore, 
to assume that whatever historical arguments give a free pass to Arti-
cle I judges today should do the same for administrative agencies.  
But here, as elsewhere, this originalist approach faces the same diffi-
culty of whether long usage should insulate the practices from consti-
tutional review.  The faint-hearted would surely say yes, on the 
grounds that the entire administrative state is equally entrenched, 
and agencies perhaps more so than Article I courts.  Indeed giving 
life time tenure to Article I judges would create only a small dent in 
the current judicial structure.  The same could hardly be said with re-
spect to legitimating independent administrative agencies. 
My own view, however, is that it is both desirable and possible to 
strip the independent agencies of their adjudicative functions.  There 
is a lot of evidence which suggests that independent administrative 
agencies behave for most purposes like executive branch agencies in 
the way in which they issue regulations and make policy.71  Even most 
scholars cannot remember from one end of the day to another which 
agencies are located in the executive branch and which are inde-
pendent.  But all that counts for naught on the question of whether 
the judicial functions of these agencies have substitute or substantial 
safeguards for judicial independence that remotely resemble those 
built in on the ground floor for Article III courts.  The answer to that 
question has to be an unambiguous no. The FTC could still promul-
gate rules and initiate enforcement proceedings.  And the NLRB 
could still oversee union recognition elections and investigate unfair 
labor practices.  But the adjudication of its claims should be turned 
over to Article III (or even Article I) courts. 
Two points—one clear and one less so—shape the discourse.  The 
first involves the use of specialized administrative agencies with cer-
 
 70 29 U.S.C. § 153(a) (Supp. I 1935).  The number of members of the NLRB was increased 
to five by the Labor Management Relationship (Taft-Hartley) Act, 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-
101, 61 Stat. 136. 
 71 See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 42, at 704–05. 
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tain well-defined subject matter areas—labor, securities, telecommu-
nications.  In one sense, this level of specialization is identical to that 
which is found with tax and bankruptcy court.  But is that formal par-
allelism sufficient to acquit the independent agencies on this score?  
To that, the answer is surely no.  The choice between Article I courts 
and independent agencies is not randomly made.  Much depends on 
the perceived nature of the issue that is likely to arise within these two 
fora.  Bankruptcy and taxation do raise their fair share of hot button 
issues, for example, but few of those issues arise in the day-to-day ap-
plication of the law, which deals largely with technical matters on 
which there are few political differences.  Not so with the other three 
areas, where deep political issues are built into the agency jurisdic-
tion.  The struggles between management and labor bear no docu-
mentation on the level of class conflict.  The allocation of licenses 
under the FCC gives rise to extensive political debate over all sorts of 
hot button issues relating to program content, affirmative action, and 
diversity.  Securities law often pits small investors against large corpo-
rations and asks fundamental questions about the viability of unregu-
lated capital markets.  The clear subject matter in these agencies tip 
off the President and Congress of the anticipated orientation of po-
tential appointees on these matters.  The appointments process is not 
subject to the kind of drag that arises with appointments to courts of 
general jurisdiction, where it is much more difficult to pigeon hole 
nominees to the President’s personal satisfaction on a wide array of 
issues.  The judge whose views you like on national security is the 
judge you fear on antitrust—yet the two distinct persona are bound at 
the hip in any court of general jurisdiction.  Those connections are 
severed with respect to administrative agencies. 
So, true to form, it is no accident that the appointive process takes 
on a different form.  The Securities and Exchange Act makes explicit 
the political valence.  Section 4(a) states: 
There is hereby established a Securities and Exchange Commission (he-
reinafter referred to as the ‘Commission’) to be composed of five com-
missioners to be appointed by the President by and with the advice and 
consent of the Senate.  Not more than three of such commissioners shall 
be members of the same political party, and in making appointments 
members of different political parties shall be appointed alternately as 
nearly as may be practicable.72   
For its part, the NLRA calls for five-year terms for its members (who 
are not judges, of course), the Chairman of which is appointed by the 
 
 72 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a) (2006). 
Feb. 2010] EXECUTIVE POWER IN POLITICAL AND CORPORATE CONTEXTS 305 
 
President.73  But it is for good reason that the three-two split is ob-
served in its actions, given the deep political splits on substantive is-
sues.  The needed matching of board members has the unfortunate 
side effect of creating log jams at renewal, for the entire operation is 
an elaborate ritual of pairing up the appointees from both sides in 
package deals such that the Democrat will not get appointed unless 
his or her Republican is appointed as well.  As the level of conflict in-
creases, the appointment process effectively stalls.  As of this writing 
the NLRB has had only two members, Wilma Liebman, Chairman, 
and Peter C. Schaumber, member, which is the minimum quorum by 
which it can do work.  The compromise intensifies the level of parti-
sanship to far greater heights than in the federal courts, where the 
recent spate of empirical evidence notes some modest level of politi-
cal disagreement, which in routine cases may be less significant than 
meets the eye.74 
In this context, it makes little sense to overrule Humphrey’s Executor 
and make these commissioners subject to the removal power of the 
President.  That situation would be wholly intolerable given the parti-
san nature of the divisions over the judicial portions of their work-
load.  The only argument is that, faced with this risk, a sensible Con-
gress might jettison the scheme altogether.  But that result would not 
happen so long as the President and Congress are controlled by the 
same party, as is the case today.  So it would be a classic illustration of 
jumping out of the frying pan into the fire.  The manifest risks of par-
tisanship and intrigue are so evident that any serious constitutional 
inquiry should not immunize the independent agency model from 
scrutiny on the basis of the long passage of time.  As urged earlier, 
the Article I court alternative is clearly preferable for the judicial 
functions of these agencies, whose wings should be clipped by the 
Supreme Court if necessary. 
E.  Delegations to the Executive Branch 
This piece of the puzzle involves the delegations that Congress 
makes to the executive, knowing, of course, that within limits the 
President does possess the right to remove key officials at will.  At this 
 
 73 29 U.S.C. § 153(a) (Supp. I 1935). 
 74 See, e.g., LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR:  THEORETICAL AND QUANTITATIVE 
PERSPECTIVES (forthcoming).  For an empirical review, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE 
JUDGES POLITICAL?:  AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2006).  For a 
skeptical view on the appellate cleaves, see Harry T. Edwards & Michael A. Livermore, Pit-
falls of Empircal Studies That Attempt to Understand the Factors Affecting Appellate Decisionmak-
ing, 58 DUKE L.J. 1895 (2009). 
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juncture, Congress faces the issue with which this paper began.  What 
institutional structures should be introduced to offset the advantage 
that the President has with a fixed four year term?  The doctrinal lens 
through which this problem is approached is the so-called “nondele-
gation” rule, which is a modern application of the Latin maxim dele-
gatus non potest delegare:  the delegatee is a person who is not allowed 
to delegate further.  This maxim has its start in the private law and its 
power can be seen in connection with the usual situation in contract 
law, which is receptive to the assignment of rights but suspicious of 
the delegation of duties.  In its simplest incarnation, delegation of a 
duty to pay carries with it a huge default risk that is not found in con-
nection with the assignment of the right to collect.  And with service 
obligations, the famous painter cannot delegate his duty to paint a 
portrait to his callow apprentice, unless he first obtains the consent of 
the other party.  All of these rules are, at bottom, default rules so that 
contracts can be drafted to either expand or contract delegation.  
The cases in which these risks are ignored in explicit contracts are 
few and far between. 
The public law context raises somewhat different issues on struc-
tural matters because in these cases the limitations should be re-
garded as impervious to political agreement.75  That point dates back 
to Locke, who wrote: 
[T]he legislative cannot transfer the power of making laws to any other hands; 
for it being but a delegated power from the people, they who have it 
cannot pass it over to others. . . . The power of the legislative, being de-
rived from the people by a positive voluntary grant and institution, can 
be no other than what that positive grant conveyed, which being only to 
make laws, and not to make legislators, the legislative can have no power to 
transfer their authority of making laws and place it in other hands.76 
That attitude surely worked its way into our constitutional tradi-
tion, with its Lockean impulse to protect wherever possible the public 
at large from government intrigue.  One corollary is that any agree-
ment between the President and the Congress, even if unanimous, 
which would let the President do what he will under a statute that es-
sentially allows him to rule by decree, is surely out of bounds.  This is 
yet another application of the basic principle that freedom of con-
tract among current holders of various public offices can never be al-
 
 75 There are clearly here shades of the structural application of the unconstitutional condi-
tions doctrine.  See supra note 15 and accompanying text; see also STEPHEN G. BREYER ET 
AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY:  PROBLEMS, TEXT AND CASES 38–74 
(5th ed. 2002) (surveying the nondelegation doctrine). 
 76 JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 81 (Thomas P. Peardon ed., Liberal 
Arts Press 1952) (1690) (emphases added). 
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lowed to undo the structural limitations that the Constitution im-
poses on the three branches of government. 
This extreme case has never come up because Congress has its 
own institutional bailiwick to protect against the President, which 
makes it difficult to persuade it to grant him such power.  At this 
point, the interpretive question is how to treat these political safe-
guards.  On the one hand, it could be said that hard cases test the 
principle, and so long as government by presidential decree is within 
limits, the delegation doctrine has teeth.  The opposite position asks, 
why introduce a doctrine that will have some teeth and then figure 
out how to allow the major delegations to the executive branch to 
take hold. 
The fruit of this deliberation is less than ideal, for it yields the 
principle that the Congress can delegate to the executive branch 
what it wants, so long as there is some “intelligible principle” that go-
verns the delegation.77  That principle carries with it little weight in 
practice, so that delegations are routinely sustained today.  But here 
again, the political economy story cannot be ignored, for the key 
question is why delegate key tasks to the executive agencies, where 
the President enjoys the removal power over subordinates, rather 
than to independent agencies, where he does not?  The answer to 
that question comes, I believe, in a set of straightforward strategic 
choices.  The independent agency, with its so-called institutional sa-
feguards, will be used in those cases where permanent bodies are 
needed to implement complex policies.  The Congress that creates 
these delegations needs to be sure that the President—not just the 
current occupant, but his successors—will not neutralize its program 
by hiring and firing his own people.  The level of residual discretion 
thus invites Congress to hedge its bets.  It knows that it cannot churn 
out the volume of work itself.  It wants to take steps to see that the 
delegation does not give excessive power to the President, who could, 
under the guise of interpretation, undo the agency’s central man-
dates. 
But the strategic calculus changes with respect to short-term dele-
gations.  The key exemplar on this point is A.L.A. Schechter Poultry 
Corp. v. United States,78 which struck down a delegation of authority to 
the President to create codes of “fair competition” under the (ghast-
ly) provisions of the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933.  Chief 
 
 77 For the recent statement on this point, see Whitman v. American Trucking Associations, 531 
U.S. 457, 473 (2001) (rejecting the view that “an agency can cure an unconstitutionally 
standardless delegation of power by declining to exercise some of that power”). 
 78 295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
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Justice Hughes wrote a learned opinion, in which he professes im-
mense difficulty in defining what is meant by “fair competition” un-
der the Act.79  And he was troubled in this effort because he knew well 
that the Federal Trade Commission received quasi-legislative and 
quasi-judicial powers to declare unlawful various acts of unfair com-
petition, all of which were undefined.  How does one keep one stat-
ute constitutional and not the other?  This is a good question, to 
which Chief Justice Hughes’s decision in Schechter offers no accept-
able answer.  And the mystery deepens because Justice Cardozo rose 
up on his common law haunches to denounce a statutory scheme 
that tolerates “delegation running riot” to the President.80 
What on earth were they talking about?  The initiatives of the Na-
tional Industrial Recovery Act were not chump change: 
In the course of its short life from August, 1933, to February, 1935, the 
Administration formulated and approved 546 codes and 185 supplemen-
tal codes filling 18 volumes and 13,000 pages; 685 amendments and mod-
ifications to these codes.  It issued over 11,000 administrative orders in-
terpreting, granting exemptions from, and establishing classifications 
under the provisions of individual codes . . . .81 
This was no small time operation. 
And where was Congress during all this?  Happy as a clam.  The 
cartel-du-jour model had swept the land, and that model is what the 
President implemented.  The genius of the legislative provision was to 
prevent monopolies:  “[t]hat such code or codes shall not permit 
monopolies or monopolistic practices.”82  So it looks like the free 
market is in action, until you read the entire Act.  The codes are 
submitted by “one or more trade or industrial associations or 
groups.”83  The bottom line:  no to single monopolies, yes to cartels.  
And these cartels would be spread out across the United States, creat-
ing an extensive membership base that was the source of large levels 
of political support for the program.  The effective restraint left to 
Congress was, moreover, as simple as it was effective.  Moreover, the 
entire program was limited to a two-year period.84  The length of op-
eration was not ambiguous, so there is little risk of judicial nullifica-
tion of the provision.  Once the original term expired, or even be-
fore, Congress could have revisited the matter and extended the 
 
 79 Id. at 531. 
 80 Id. at 553 (Cardozo, J., concurring). 
 81 BREYER ET AL., supra note 75, at 46 (quoting LOUIS L. JAFFE & NATHANIEL L. NATHANSON, 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS 52 (4th ed. 1976)). 
 82 National Industrial Recovery Act, ch. 90, § 3(a)(2), 48 Stat. 195, 196 (1933). 
 83 Id. § 3(a). 
 84 Id. § 2(c). 
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program if it so chose.  Let there be divided power and the President 
will see his delegation shrink as the usual wall of suspicion rises.  In-
deed, the real tragedy of striking down this unholy situation on non-
delegation grounds is that it invited the perpetuation of various bits 
of the program through other legislation, such as the Agricultural 
Marketing Agreement Act of 1937,85 the Agricultural Adjustment Act 
of 1938,86 and the National Labor Relations Act,87 all of which have 
more structure. 
The creation of permanent agencies inside the executive branch 
gives rise to other questions of legislative oversight.  In this regard, it 
is no coincidence, in my view, that the first appearance of the legisla-
tive veto is in 1932, at the start of the New Deal revolution, only to 
expand in popularity hereafter.88  These vetoes could be done by a 
single house of Congress or by both houses acting in concert.  But 
one feature common to both systems was that the action in Congress 
did not meet the dual constitutional requirements of presentment 
and bicameralism.89  The dual requirements were part of the general 
scheme that was intended to fortify one central tenet of limited gov-
ernment:  its basic presumption against the passage of new legisla-
tion. 
The legislative veto is, of course, a legislative device that allows ei-
ther house of Congress, or even some fraction thereof, to override 
decisions in individual cases made within the bowels of the executive 
branch.  It can only be introduced by general legislation, and is sub-
ject to repeal in the same fashion, so that it would be wrong to think 
of the process as one that either or both houses of Congress could 
adopt simply on their own motions.  Wholly apart from the textual 
issues, it could easily be justified on the ground that it is yet another 
of the many adjustments to constitutional structure that make sense 
in light of the huge change in scope and scale of federal operations.  
Put otherwise, once expansion of federal power gets larger, other ad-
 
 85 Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, ch. 296, 50 Stat. 246. 
 86 Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, ch. 30, 52 Stat. 31. 
 87 National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (2006). 
 88 See James Abourezk, The Congressional Veto:  A Contemporary Response to Executive Encroach-
ment on Legislative Prerogatives, 52 IND. L.J. 323, 324 (1977) (“Since 1932, when the first ve-
to provision was enacted into law, 295 congressional veto-type procedures have been in-
serted in 196 different statutes as follows:  from 1932 to 1939, five statutes were affected; 
from 1940–49, nineteen statutes; between 1950–59, thirty-four statutes; and from 1960–
69, forty-nine.  From the year 1970 through 1975, at least one hundred sixty-three such 
provisions were included in eighty-nine laws.”). 
 89 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (“Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Repre-
sentatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the President of 
the United States . . . .”). 
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justments have to be made as well.  In response, it can be argued that 
the constitutional structure is intended to guard against just these al-
terations of the process through legislative means.  The President 
gets a veto of legislation from the Congress.  Congress does not get to 
veto the executive actions of the President and his officers. 
The crosscurrents on this issue first came before the Supreme 
Court only forty years after the practice was first instituted, which of 
course tilts the balance implicitly in favor of its constitutionality.  
Nonetheless, the watershed case of INS v. Chadha90 addressed the con-
stitutionality of the Immigration and Nationality Act, insofar as it pro-
vided that if either the Senate or the House announced that it did 
not support the suspension of the deportation of an alien by the At-
torney General, the Attorney General was bound to deport the alien 
or to otherwise arrange for his voluntary departure.  The House of 
Representatives overturned the Attorney General’s decision to sus-
pend Chadha’s deportation, rejecting in effect the administrative de-
termination of hardship.  The issue before the Court was whether the 
decision comported with the rigid system of separation of powers.  
The Court concluded that the decision did not so comport because it 
did not take the presentation and bicameralism requirements seri-
ously. 
The first point to note about this odd statute is that it was only a 
one-way ratchet.  The basic legislation did not allow either house of 
Congress to suspend any deportation that had been ordered the At-
torney General.  It only allowed them to overturn decisions that sus-
pended deportation.  The usual instinct in actions that have real con-
sequences to individuals is to give them, not the state, all the 
procedural advantages; but this was not a case where the deported 
alien could make a last-ditch plea. So the issue is:  why do the proce-
dural rules cut in the opposite direction?  The explanation must run 
along the following lines.  The individual who is deported has every 
incentive to fight the entire matter in the courts.  If there is a sweet-
heart deal with Attorney General, however, then there is no one with 
standing to challenge it.  The matter, therefore, comes back to Con-
gress, which faces constant protectionist pressures to keep immigra-
tion down to limit the competition with domestic workers, which is 
built into the fabric of all our H1B visas.  So how then to classify the 
peculiar arrangements?  It is surely not legislation, as it only applies 
to a single individual.  Unlike private member bills, it does not go 
through both houses, and is in any event the review of a judicial deci-
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sion.  Yet, by the same token, it is surely not any form of adjudication 
since the action is valid without any hearing, a report or a statement 
of reasons.91  And it does not look as though it is an exercise of execu-
tive power.  Ultimately, the Supreme Court struck the statute down 
on the ground that it did not comply with the minimum require-
ments of legislation, namely presentment and bicameralism.92  If any-
thing, the statute looks closest to a Bill of Attainder, which the Consti-
tution prohibits the states from enacting.93  But it hardly matters.  
There are thousands of these veto provisions that are actively used 
today.  Chadha, it appears, has not made a dent in the old system 
whose formal requirements are often too stiff.  And at this point, the 
old practices continue to hold sway. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
In sum, any analysis of the unitary executive cannot take place in a 
constitutional void.  Within the early constitutional framework of lim-
ited federal powers, the issue is not all that acute because there are 
few issues with which the Congress cannot deal in advance.  But as 
the systems become larger and more ambitious, the entrenched posi-
tion of the President puts Congress in a more difficult position, to the 
extent that its (current) majority perceives long term conflicts with 
the executive branch.  As I have argued elsewhere, the rise of the in-
dependent administrative agency is yet another tile in the complex 
mosaic that ushers in the expansion of government power through a 
relaxation of the federalism limitations under the Commerce Clause 
and the property and economic liberties protections under the Bill of 
Rights.94  These lockstep maneuvers make sense if divided govern-
ment is thought to be the problem rather than the solution.  But in 
its own way, a strong defense of the President’s removal power is that 
it increases the costs of legislative/executive cooperation, which, on 
balance, leads to smaller government.  This, in turn, is a blessing 
whose benefits are sorely missing today.  It is possible to lament the 
 
 91 Cf. id. at 960–67 (Powell, J., concurring) (arguing that the legislative veto was akin to ju-
dicial action). 
 92 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2, 3 (mandating that every bill that has passed both houses 
of Congress must be presented to the President of the United States, and that if the Pres-
ident disapproves of an order, resolution, or vote, the Senate and House or Representa-
tives must repass it by two-thirds of the vote). 
 93 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (“No Bill of Attainder . . . shall be passed.”); id. § 10, cl. 1 
(“No State shall . . . pass any Bill of Attainder . . . .”). 
 94 For the arguments, see Epstein, supra note 42, at 496–98. 
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current path of development.  But so long as we live in an era of big 
government, it is not possible to change it. 
